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A Descriptive Portrait of State
Judicial Oversight of State
Agencies
Ric k A. Swanson
University of Louisiana at Lafayette

Studies of sta te ju d icial oversig ht of s tate age n c ies ar e
practica lly n o n existent.
This is th e fi rs t stu dy to offe r a
detailed d escri p tion of th e na tur e of th is ove rs ig ht . A
dataset was co nst ru cte d of 5 5 0 state s upr e m e co urt cases
invo l ving j ud ic ia l overs ig h t of fo ur ty p es of age nc i es
f rom 27 s ta t es fo r th e years /991 to /993 . Th e da ta s h ow
th at s tate su pr e m e cour t d ecis io ns review in g st at e age n cy
ac t ions com m o nly occ ur, a re ty pi call y un a nimou s. ar e
ge n era lly su pp o rt ive of th e age n cy ac ti o n, and ar e
s li gh tly m o re of ten li be ra l t ha n co nse r va ti ve. Mo reove r,
th ese tr end s are large ly consis t ent a c ross st a tes.

0

ne of the basic tenet s of American government , at both
the federal and state levels, is the principle of separation
of powers . Thus , an important empirical question in evaluating
American democracy is how the separation of powers plays out
when different branches of government interact. One such
interaction occur s when courts review the actions of bureaucratic
agenci es. Thi s interaction has been extensively studied at the
federal level, with many studies examining federal court
oversight of the federal bureaucracy (Canon and Giles 1972,
Handber g 1979, Hansen et al. 1995, Humphries and Songer
1999, Kilwein and Bri sbin 1996, Sheehan 1992, Spaeth 1963,
Tannenhau s 1960, Willison 1986). Shapiro (1992) , however , in a
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review piece outlining the then-current state of judicial politics
research , lamented the myopic research focus on the federal
courts , and the Supreme Court in particular , as if it were the only
court in the United States or even the world . He encouraged
research that might move outward and downward from the U. S.
Supreme Court.
Shapiro 's observation about the lack of
scholarship on state courts applies with particular accuracy to the
study of state court oversight of state bureaucracies . Very few
such examinations exist , and we know exceptionally little about
the relationship between state courts and state bureaucracies .
The only published research to empirically explore the issue
of judicial oversight at the state level is Frank (1980) . Frank
examined 533 agency cases from four state supreme courts
(California, Michigan , New York, and Pennsylvania) for the
years 1970 through 1974. Frank's exploratory study found over
85% of agency cases occurred within only seven issue
categories: social welfare, legal professionalism , fiscal policy ,
professional licensing, public utility regulation, safety-health
regulation, and labor-manag~ment.
In addition, the supreme
courts of the states studied supported agency decision s from a
low of 51.3% (Michigan) to a high of 66.7% (New York) with an
overall support level of 56.4% . Great variation occurred ,
however , within individual functional areas . For example, state
supreme courts were most supportive of agency decisions
involving regulation of the legal profession, supporting such
actions at a rate of 78.3% (83/106). Toward the lower end of the
support spectrum , state supreme courts supported social welfare
agency decisions at a rate of only 42.3% (52/123) , most of which
involved an agency denial of a benefit to an individual.
Frank's research was groundbreaking in its study of state
judicial oversight, _yet remarkably it remains the only published
state judicial oversight research to date. There is no analytic
VO L. 34 2006
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analysis of such oversight , and numerous descriptive questions
remain. Although analytic questions are important , addressing
analytic questions before first describing the nature of this
oversight would be to put the proverbial cart before the horse. A
basic description is necessary so one can then decide what
characteristics of this oversight warrant further, in-depth
analysis .
Among the countless descriptive questions left
unanswered are: What are judicial support levels for agency
action s in other states? How frequently do state courts review
state agency action s? What are the policy areas and ideological
nature of these agency actions reviewed? To what degree are
state supreme courts unanimou s or divided in their review
deci sions? Does court support vary between "liberal" or
"conservative" agency actions ? Does this support vary across
polic y areas? Finally , are any trends that exist consistent across
states? This study addresses these questions by exploring the
nature of state supreme court oversight of state administrative
agencies and offering a descriptive portrait of such oversight.
METHODS

Data from a preliminary study conducted by the author
revealed the five most frequently reviewed agency actions in
state supreme courts were, in order, the issue areas of attorney
discipline , social welfare benefits , taxation, environmental
regulation , and public utility regulation.
The latter four
categories serve as particularly useful categories for studying
judicial oversight of the bureaucracy.
First, these issue
categorie s tend to have ideological overtones and so most cases
in these issue areas pose clear ideological choices for courts.
Second , agency actions in these issue areas often have policy
significance beyond the particular litigants involved. Thus, the
latter four issue areas are both more interesting and more
T II E JOU RNAL OF PO LI T ICA L SCIENC I~
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important to study than attorney discipline cases. For the full
study presented here, all signed opinions 1 of agency oversight
cases in the four selected policy areas which had an agency as a
named party to the case 2 were coded from 27 state supreme
courts (AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, FL, GA, IN, MD, MA, MI, MO,
NJ, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, PA, RI, TN, TX, VA, WA, WV, WI,
and WY) for the years 1991-1993. Due to normal research
1
Memorandum decisions and per c11ria111
decisions ("by the court " decisions that do not
list an authoring judge) were not included. This was done for two reasons . First, the
large majority of these types of' decisions provide only minimal facts and analysis of the
case involved (and sometimes no discussion at all), so that some of the factors examined
in this study (such as standard of review) could not be accurately determined by reading
the case . Second, the very reason such cases are decided as memorandum or per curiam
decisions is because the issues are so straightforward, and often involve so little
substance, that the cases are not very instructive to the purposes of this study . As some
examples, many of the memorandum or per curia,11decisions observed during coding
resolved only simple procedural mailers such as the ripeness or mootness of the appeal.
Other cases simply reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of a recently
issued state supreme court case . Still others stated merely that the case was being
affirmed for the reasons expressed in the intermediate appellate court opinion, and
offered no further discussion or evaluation of the legal issues.
1
The observations in the study here were limited to cases in which a state-level
administrative agency engaged in an independent action that was later challenged in
court, and the agency was a named party . This was done for two reasons . First, in some
stales , certain types of agencies such as worker 's compensation agencies do not take
independent actions, but instead go directly to court where a trial court judge makes the
decision whether and to what degree workers ' compensation benefits should be awarded .
Thus, there is never an independent agency action to review, and all that an appellate
court reviews is the trial court decision . This type of case is largely useless to the study
here which auempts lo determine how courts oversee the acrions of agencies, not simply
the policy posirions of those agencies .
Second, also under the administrative procedures of several states, interested
parties may challenge an agency's action without involving the agency as a party to the
case . For example , in the workers' compensation scheme in several states, once an
agency makes a decision regarding benefits , the worker and employer may litigate
against one another regarding the propriety of those benefits without any further
involvement by the agency in that litigation . In such situations, the agency often believes
its particular decision does not warrant the expense of litigation resources , and so the
agency decides not lo interject itself in the litigation . The inclusion of such cases might
skew the results of the larger study in which agency actions are directly challenged.
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constraints, a sample of 27 states was chosen rather than the full
population of fifty states . Choices were guided by interests in
providing geographic and population diversity as well as
institutional variation such as methods of judicial selection and
retention and judicial term length, as well as the presence or
absence of an intermediate appellate court. The unit of
observation consisted of an individual court case. All cases were
accessed and read on the Lexis/Nexis on-line legal database. The
final number of observations was 550 cases.
Variables were operationalized as follows: Cases in which
the agency won were coded 1, otherwise 0.3 Regarding the
ideological direction of a case outcome, judicial scholars have
long accepted the convention of coding certain types of case
outcomes as liberal or conservative (Segal and Spaeth 1993).
For the sake of convenience and uniformity only, and consistent
with general convention, conservative case outcomes are often
coded 0 and liberal case outcomes are coded 1.4 The liberalconservative coding is based on Spaeth's (1990) coding in the
United States Supreme Court Database, with minor adaptations.
The following coding scheme is used for the ideological
direction of a court decision:
Social Welfare Benefits

I=

pro-worker's compensation claimant
pro-public aid claimant
pro-unemployment compensation
claimant
pro-retirement benefits claimant

0=

reverse of above

3

Cases with an unclear or mixed direction of support (such as affirmed in part and
reversed in part) were coded 2 .
·
Cases that had no discernible ideological direction or an unclear ideological direction
were coded 2.

4

Tl fE J OU RNAL

C)I,'

P O LITI C1\L SC IEN C E

DESCRIPTIVE PORTRAIT OF STATE JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF
STAT£ AGENCIES

Tax Policy

Public Utility Regulation

Environment

63

I=

pro-taxation

O=

reverse of above

I=

pro-regulation of utility company
pro-utility rate reduction or limitation

O=

reverse of above

I=

anti-developer
anti-polluter
anti-resource exploiter

O=

reverse of above

The liberal-conservative distinctions just noted are standard
conventions in the judicial literature . The " liberal" position is
deemed to favor social welfare benefits, favor higher taxes in
order to provide those benefits, favor regulation of businesses,
and favor protection of the environment. The "conservative"
position is deemed to be the reverse of those positions. Agency
actions with liberal outcomes are coded 1, and agency actions
with conservative outcomes are coded 0.
Liberal and
conservative agency outcomes are defined in the same manner as
is the ideological direction of the court's decision,just described.
VOL. 34 2006
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RESULTS A D DISCUSSION

Agency Actions
The breakdown of the cases into agency categories is
presented in the Table below. Almost half the cases were social
welfare cases, comprising 48.4% overall of state supreme court
cases overseeing state agencies. Social Welfare was comprised
mostly of worker's compensation cases, but included cases
involving unemployment benefits, retirement benefits, or public
welfare benefits as well.
As the Table indicates, state agencies adopted a conservative
position in 45.5% of the cases and a liberal position in 48.7% of
the cases. 5 When the agencies are broken down by category,
obvious differences appear. An overwhelming 94.9% of tax
agency actions that reached a state supreme court were the result
of an individual or business challenging a tax assessment (coded
as a liberal action) by the agency. On the opposite end of the
spectrum, the agency action in social welfare cases was
conservative in 79.4% of the cases; i.e. the agency denied or
limited social welfare benefits to an individual.
Of
environmental agency actions, 74.2% involved liberal agency
actions where the agency was attempting to restrict the activity
of a person or business that might degrade the environment.
Actions by utility regulatory agencies were more evenly
divided in their ideological leanings, with only 59.0% of utility
cases involving agency actions that had liberal outcomes such as
5

In only 5.8% of the cases did the agency action in question possess an ideological
direction that could not be labeled as clearly "liberal " or clearly "co nservative. " For
example, where a utility regulatory agency adjudicates a dispute between two electricitygenerating companies over the degree to which each has the right to generate electricity,
it is unclear whether favoring one company over the other is a "liberal" or "conservative "
agency position .
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increased regulations or rate limitations being placed on utility
companies.

Table 1
Agency Actions and Court Outcomes by Agency Type 6
Agency
Type

Freq.

Soc.
Welfare

266

Tax

Freq. %

Liberal
Agency
Actions

Conserv.
Agency
Actions

48.4

52

201

20.6

139

25.3

131

7

94.9

Env't

75

13.6

49

17

74.2

Utilities

70

12.7

36

25

59 .0

Total

550

100.0%

268

250

51 .7%

%

Agency
Actions
Liberal

6

Totals for " liberal'" and "conservative " cases are less than the total number of observed
cases because only those agency outcomes possessing a clear, unambiguous ideological
direction were classified as either "liberal" or "conservative ."
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Table I, cont'd
Agency Actions and Court Outcomes by Agency Type

Soc .
Welfare

74.0

% Court
Support
(Conserv.
Agency
Actions
53.0

Tax

62.I

83.3

63. I

60.0

Env't

46.7

70.6

53.2

41.9

Utilities

68.8

69.6

69. 1

51.8

Total

633 %

56.6%

59.5%

53.2%

Agency
Type

% Court
Support
(Liberal
Actions)

Agency

% Court
Support
(Overall)

% Court
Outcomes
Liberal

57 3

52.8

These differences in liberal and conservative outcome rates
across policy areas are in all likelihood a function of the
structure of the kinds of disputes occurring in these different
policy areas rather than a result of ideologically-based behavioral
influences on the part of agency decision-makers. That is,
individuals will challenge only a denial or reduction of social
welfare benefits (defined as a conservative agency outcome) but
not an increase in such benefits. Similarly, individuals or
business will challenge only an increase in taxes (defined as a
liberal agency outcome) but not a reduction in taxes. Thus,
structurally, social welfare agency outcomes challenged in court
T IIE JOURNAL
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are inherently going to be largely conservative , while tax agency
outcomes challenged in court are inherently going to be largely
liberal.
Frequency of Oversight Cases
State supreme courts issued on average 20.4 signed opinions
in agency oversight cases during the three-year period studied.
This equates to 6.8 cases per year. However, individual states
varied widely in their agency oversight caseloads. Some state
supreme courts, such as the ones in North Dakota and
Massachusetts, consistently heard a large number of oversight
cases from year to year, issuing signed opinions in fifteen-totwenty agency cases each year during the period studied. Other
state supreme courts, such as the ones in Michigan or Georgia ,
were just the opposite , hearing only one or less oversight cases
per year on average.
One possible explanation for some of the variation in
oversight caseloads across states involves the presence or
absence of an intermediate appellate court in the state. States
with larger populations possess an intermediate-level appellate
court, given that an intermediate appellate court helps address
the higher number of cases being litigated within the state. An
intermediate appellate-level court relieves much of the supreme
court 's workload , because otherwise the state supreme court
would need to hear all appeals within the state . Because of this,
the presence of an intermediate appellate court also brings a
greater degree of discretion to the state supreme court in
choosing which cases it will hear being appealed from the
intermediate appellate court . This increased docket discretion
exists because there is less need for the state supreme court to
hear any given case on appeal when the intermediate appellate
court has already reviewed the trial court 's decision in that case
VO L. 34 2006
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for error. It might be the situation that appellate courts are able
to resolve many agency oversight cases that would otherwise be
sent to their states' supreme courts, so that state supreme courts
in such states hear relatively fewer agency oversight cases.
To see if there is a relationship between the existence of an
intermediate appellate court in a state and the agency oversight
caseload of that state's supreme court, agency caseload for the
three-year period studied was first converted to the percent of a
supreme court's total discretionary docket allocated to agency
cases. This was calculated by taking the number of agency
review cases and dividing by the total discretionary docket. 7
This controls for the fact that different state supreme courts have
different total caseloads and different discretionary dockets, such
that (for example) ten agency cases out of one court's
discretionary caseload might not be the same resource allocation
as ten agency cases out of another court's discretionary caseload.
Then at-test was performed between the different means of the
percent of discretionary docket allocated to agency oversight
cases with and without the presence of an intermediate appellate
court. States without an intermediate appellate court were
significantly more likely (p<.01) to allocate their discretionary
docket to the oversight of agency actions. States without an
intermediate appellate court allocated 7.7% of their total
discretionary docket in the three-year period studied to cases
involving agency oversight, versus 1.5% for states without an
intermediate appellate court, a 6.2% difference.
The evidence tends to suggest that state supreme courts in
states with intermediate appellate courts believe their limited
docket discretion is better used by granting appeals to other
implicitly more important or consequential types of cases. In
7
The percent of state supreme court dockets that is discretionary is from State Court
Caseload Statistics (1993), available from the National Center for State Courts.
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other words, most agency actions involve adjudications which
themselves probably appear to have little precedential value or
consequence beyond the narrow facts and legal questions
involved in the case. Thus, given a choice between granting an
appeal in an agency oversight cases versus a case of seemingly
more important or broader consequence and precedential
value-such as a case involving the death penalty-- a state
supreme court which has discretion to choose is more likely to
grant appeal in the latter case.
On the other hand, in states without an intermediate court,
state legislatures generally believe that certain types of cases
require at least one opportunity for judicial review for error, and
thus review by the state supreme court is made mandatory in
many agency cases. For example, in North Dakota, the state
with the highest number of agency cases in the data here, the
state legislature has given all litigants disputing an agency action
a 1ight of appeal to th!! state supreme court. 8 In fact, of the eleven
states without an intermediate appellate court, the supreme
courts in five of those states--Delaware, Maine, Nevada , West
Virginia and Wyoming--possessed no docket discretion
whatsoever. In another three of those states-Mississippi, South
Dakota and Vermont- the state supreme court had docket
discretion in the single-digit percentiles. This probably explains,
for example, why Wyoming recorded the second-highest
frequency of agency review cases in the data here . West
Virginia, the other state lacking an intermediate appellate court
that was included in the study here , contributed 26 observations
to the data, which stil1 placed it in the upper 3i 11percentile of the
examined states. Thus , states without intermediate appellate
8

Chapter 28-32 -2 1 of the Administrative Agencies Practice s Act, N.D. Cent. Code, § 2832-2 1 (2000).
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courts possessed significantly higher frequencies of agency
oversight cases , which was a reflection of the smaller
discretionary docket those state supreme courts possess.

Unanimity
Fully 80% (440/550) of cases were decided by a unanimous
vote ; only 20.0% of cases overall were nonunanimous. This tells
us that the most appropriate decisional outcome in agency
oversight cases is rarely in such dispute that a court divides over
that outcome. In the vast majority of cases here, a supermajority of state supreme court justices deciding a case
coalesced around a single outcome which the justices on the
court agreed was the most appropriate decisional outcome.
Importantly , this obviously includes justices of opposite partisan
and ideological leanings . This comports with the findings of
Glick and Pruet ( 1986) who found the mean rate of
nonunanimity across all 50 states for the years 1980-81 was 18.5
percent. Although a thorough analysis of the possible bases for
unanimity goes beyond the scope of the discussion here, these
data support proponents of the legal model of judicial decisionmaking , who assert that in most cases there exists a generally
"correct " or "best" legal outcome which is reasonably
determinable by reasonable people trained in the law applying
reasonably objective legal standards .
Ideological Direction of Judicial Outcomes
Although state supreme courts differed in their tendency to
reach liberal versus conservative outcomes across states, the
tendency is noticeably skewed in favor of liberal outcomes, with
55.6% of cases overall reaching a liberal outcome. In states with
more than one observation (Michigan reached 100% liberal
outcomes with only a single observation) , ideological tendencies
ranged from 32.1 % liberal outcomes in Rhode Island to 83%
liberal outcomes in Arizona . In only seven out of 27 statesT II E ~OU R t\L 0 1: PO LI T IC,\L SC IENCE
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Alabama , Florida , New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Tennessee and Texas---did supreme courts reach a greater
number of conservative than liberal outcomes. As the Table
reveals , the tendency to reach a majority of liberal outcomes was
true across agency types as well, with the exception of
environmental cases. An examination of the possible causes of
this slight overall liberal-leaning bias is beyond the scope of the
study here; however, a natural potential suspect is the ideological
leanings of state supreme court justices. Further studies need to
examine whether the ideological leanings of state supreme court
justices has a relationship with state supreme court review of
state agency actions . What is undisputable , however, is that
there appears to be a clear and generally consistent tendency for
state supreme courts to reach a majority of liberal decisions
when reviewing state agency actions.
Support for Agency Actions
Once an agency action reached a state supreme court, those
courts were fairly equally divided in their overall treatment of
liberal versus conservative agency decisions, as well as of
different agency types. The Table demonstrates that state
supreme courts supported agencies more often than not, with a
59.5% rate of overall support for the agency actions studied.
This support rate was generally true across states. In only six out
of 27 states--C olorado, New Jersey, Pennsylvania , Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and Texas---did overall support for agency
actions drop below 50%. Moreover, even in those five states,
only New Jersey 's level of support was particularly low at 25%,
whereas the other four states still supported agency actions at
least 40% of the time. As the Table shows, this was consistent
across agency types as well.
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One thing is clear from these data: state supreme courts
support a majority of the actions by state-level administrative
agencies (approximately 60% overall), and this tendency to
support more than half of agency actions occurs across most
states and across ideological outcomes of agency actions .
Studies of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U .S. Courts of
Appeals, on the other hand, show that these federal courts uphold
around 70% of agency actions (e.g. Sheehan 1992). One
possible explanation for the lower support rate of state agencies
might be the fact that state agencies tend to possess fewer
resources than do federal agencies (Funk 1991). State agencies
generally have fewer personnel (both technical and legal) and
smaller funds to commission investigations and evaluations by
independent experts. In either situation , a reviewing court is
probably more likely to overturn agency conclusions , especially
when those conclusions are rebutted by experts for the agency's
litigation opponent.
A second possible reason for the difference in the level of
federal court support for federal agencies and state supreme
court support for state agencies is the type of agency actions
most frequently litigated in appeals. By far the largest category
of agency actions that were considered by state supreme courts
in the cases observed involved adjudicatory actions , in which an
agency decides the outcome of a dispute between the agency and
a regulated entity. The large majority of these adjudications ,
moreover, involved an issue of statutory interpretation. In this
category of administrative law cases , courts apply a de nova
standard of review where courts decide the case "from new"
without any presumption of correctness being given to the
agency 's interpretation of law. This is because interpreting
statutes or other laws (such as Constitutions or treaties) is the
precise nature of expertise that courts possess. They are the
entity that is best in a position of legal knowledge and
T ITE J OU RNA L OF PO LITI CA L SC I ENCE
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experience to interpret laws, and courts regularly and expressly
offer this justification for applying the de novo standard of
review. Put simply, "an erroneous interpretation of a statute by
an administrative agency is not entitled to deference" ( Woods v.
Executive Director of Communities and Development, 583
N .E.2d 845 ([Mass.1992]). The fact that the large majority of
cases in the study here were reviewed by this standard of review
probably accounts for why the overall level of support for
agency actions is not higher.
On the other hand, only 7.1 % of observed cases involved
judicial review of rulemaking actions. These types of agency
actions receive the greatest proclaimed deference from courts. In
reviewing agency rulemaking actions, courts apply the "arbitrary
and capricious" test, "substantial evidence" test or some other
analogous standard of review that gives a high degree of
deference to the technical and policy expertise of the agency. A
common expression of deference was provided by the North
Dakota Supreme when it declared, "This court exercises restraint
and will not act as a 'super board' when reviewing administrative
agency findings and determinations ... We should not substitute
our judgment for that of qualified experts in the administrative
agencies " (Hins v. Lucas Western [and Job Service North
Dakota], 484 N.W.2d 491, 494-95 ([N.D. 1992]).
The legal standard of review has been considered as a factor
in only a single prior judicial study (Humphries and Songer
1999) which involved the federal Courts of Appeal, and the
results here are inconsistent with those findings. In the data
here, there was no statistically significant difference between the
support rates in cases involving a deferential versus nondeferential standard of review. It should be emphasized that
these findings are tentative only, and certainly call for additional
study. A more detailed analysis of the bases for state court
VOL. 34 2006
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support of state agencies is beyond the scope of the article here
but is certainly a promising avenue of further research.
CONCLUSION

State supreme court decisions reviewing state agency actions
are frequent, typically unanimous, and generally supportive of
the agency action. Reviewing actions also more often result in
liberal rather than conservative case outcomes, although this
trend is only slight. Perhaps the most surprising result is that all
these trends just mentioned are generally consistent across states,
with relatively few exceptions.
The data here, however, raise as many or more questions for
possible future study as they answer. What are the numerous
causal factors that influence state supreme courts whether to rule
in favor of state agencies? Is it the expertise of agency experts,
or the lack of technical expertise by judges, or a combination
thereof? Does this expertise by either agency employees or
judges vary across policy areas? Is the degree of support for
agencies also driven in pa1t by the public's ideological attitudes
within the state? In a related manner, to what degree do judges
tend to favor agency outcomes that comport with those judges'
own ideological leanings? And does the influence of the public 's
or judges' ideological makeup on agency oversight vary
depending on the agency type or nature of the agency action in
question as adjudicatory or rulemaking? Also, does the legal
standard of review that is applied in a case affect the likelihood
of support for the agency action at issue, and does this vary by
agency type?
There is also the question of how institutional factors beyond
the presence of an appellate court influence support for agency
actions. How do such institutional features as judicial selection
and retention mechanisms influence such support?
For
example , do elected judges respond to the public 's attitudes in
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overseeing agency actions , or do appointed judges respond to the
attitudes of the governor or legislature in such cases? Does
length of judicial term influence agency oversight in any manner,
and if so to what degree? Also, in many states , there are
constitutional or legislative mechanisms set up whereby the
legislature or governor or both can review agency actions
directly, especially rulemaking actions . How does such an
institutional structure affect judicial oversight of agency actions?
For example, do courts defer to the agency oversight expressly
or impliedly performed by governors or legislatures? And does
this vary by agency type or nature of the agency action in
question, as adjudicatory or rulemaking? And how does the
ideology of judges interact with all these institutional
mechanisms when judicial oversight of agency actions occurs?
As can be seen, there is a plethora of these and many more
unanswered questions surrounding state supreme court oversight
of state administrative agencies that await future, more analytic
studies. Nevertheless, the descriptive data here have begun to
paint the broad outline regarding state supreme court oversight
of state administrative agencies.
It remains for numerous
additional studies to add further detail to that portrait .
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